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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION,

BRIEF OF

APPELLfu~T

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA
J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER,
ELDON J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON,
JEAN L. CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER,
N. J. WHITE, AUDREY WHITE,
WILMA WHITE, OTIS DIBLER,
DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, GRACE DAVIS,
and MARLOWE C. SMITH,

CASE NO. 16032

Defendants-Respondents.

* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiffappellant, Rio Algom Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
"Rio") against two groups of respondent-defendants, the Jimcos
and the Audreys.

2

1

Rio's complaint seeks a declaration of the

method it should employ in calculating and paying royalty
obligations owed to both groups of Defendants under two agreements relating to the lease of certain unpatented uranium
mining claims.

l

This group consists of Jimco Ltd., Humeca Exploration
Company, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer (both individually
and as Executrix of the Estate of Daniel H. Meyer), Eldon J.
Card, Norma Hudson and Jean L. Card.
2

This group consists of Audrey White, N. Y. White, Wilma
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
White,
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Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis and Marlowe
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The Jimco defendants counterclaimed against Rio, seeking
rescission or reformation and damages based on theories of
mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, breach of an implied
covenant, fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

The Jimcos

also crossclaimed against the Audrey defendants on theories of
mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
The Audrey defendants crossclaimed against the Jimco
defendants and counterclaimed against Rio asserting breach of
an agreement with the Jimco defendants, of which Rio is the
assignee.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This appeal is from an Order entered by Judge Dean E.
Conder of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
which dismissed all claims by Rio and the Jimcos against the
Audreys, all claims by the Audreys against Rio and the Jimcos,
and certain claims by Rio against the Jimcos.

The Order here

appealed from was entered by Judge Conder based upon an agreement purportedly binding all parties, including Rio, although
only the Jimcos and the Audreys were parties to that agreement, and Rio timely objected to its provisions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Rio seeks reversal of Judge Conder's Order, which dismissed the Audreys from this lawsuit and determined that Rio

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

has no cause of action based on the agreement entered into
between the Audreys and the Jimcos.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Relationship of the Parties.

Rio and the Audreys are tenants in common of certain
unpatented mining claims in San Juan County, Utah, containing
valuable uranium ore.

Rio owns a one-fourth and the Audreys

a three-fourth undivided interest in these properties.

In

June 1968, Rio and the Audreys entered into an agreement
leasing these claims to the Jimcos.

That agreement has been

styled the "Amended Audrey Lease" in this lawsuit (R. 74-125).
In July 1968, the Jimcos in turn granted Rio an option to
take an assignment of their leasehold interest in those uranium
claims under an agreement entitled the "Rio-Jimco Option Agreement"

(R. 7-72).

Rio exercised this option, took possession

of the claims, developed a uranium mine, and built a mill to
refine the ore extracted from these claims and others.

Since

taking possession in 1968 Rio has been mining, refining and
marketing the uranium ore extracted from the claims (R. 2101) .
The following schematic summarizes the relationships
between the parties:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lessors

Co-owners of
unpatented
mineral claims

AUDREYS (3/4 owner)
RIO (1/4 owner)

AMENDED AU DREY LEASE

'"

JIMCOS
(Lessee)

l
RIO-JIMCO OPTION AGREEMENT

If

RIO
(Assignee of
Leasehold)

2.

Pertinent Royalty Provisions.
(a)

Royalties under the Amended Audrey Lease.

In

the Amended Audrey Lease the Jimcos agreed to pay a royalty of
four percent of the price received for yellowcake
Audrey defendants and Rio, the owners-lessors,

(u 3o 8 )

to the

(R. 80-83).

In

addition, the Audreys and Rio reserved the right in the Amended
Audrey Lease to have those royalties based on eight percent of
the fair market value of crude ore produced from the claims, in
lieu of the four percent royalty just described (R. 80).

In

other words, the owners were entitled to royalties based on
either four percent of the price received for the refined
product (u 3o ) or on eight percent of the value of unprocessed,
8
raw ore, at their election.

The decision to elect either the

eight percent ore or four percent yellowcake royalty is vested
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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exclusively in the Audreys under the Amended Audrey Lease, and
Rio is not entitled to participate in that decision (R. 80, 118).
Rio gave up the right to participate in making the royalty
election decision after negotiations between all three parties.
The other parties were concerned that Rio would have a conflict
of interest in making the election because it was both a lessor
(under the Lease) and a lessee (under the Rio-Jimco Option
Agreement).

As the Audrey lease exP,lains:

21.3 Rio
. shall, by reason of its
interest in this Lease as described in
Section II hereof, be excluded from any
vote or decision of the lessors relating
to royalties. .
[R.l20]
2.3 The parties hereto recognize and
acknowledge that Rio Algorn Corporation,
in a capacity distinct from its capacity
as one of the Lessors herein, on June 18,
1968 held a valid and subsisting option
to acquire an assignment of the leasehold interest of the Lessee.
The
parties hereto recognize the validity of
the exercise of said option by Rio . . . .
[Section II, R.79-80].
While Rio delegated the election decision to the Audreys
in the foregoing provisions, however, it certainly expected
that the Audreys would make the election from time to time so
as to choose the election which would pay them the most
money.

That decision would of course also benefit Rio since

it was entitled to one-fourth of the total royalties under
either election.

As one permissible royalty formula became more

lucrative than the other because of changing market conditions
for ore and yellowcake, all the parties doubtless anticipated
that the Audreys would choose the more profitable of the two
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
elections.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(b)

Royalties under the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement.

After Rio exercised the option granted to it by the Jimcos in
the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement, it assumed the lessees' obligation to pay royalties under the Amended Audrey Lease (R. 25).
After Rio exercised that option it also became obligated to pay
royalties to the Jirnco defendants.

In summary, Rio became

obligated by virtue of the two agreements to pay royalties to
itself, the Jimcos, and the Audreys (R. 33-43).
Like one of the two royalties payable to itself and the
Audreys, the royalties which Rio was obligated to pay to the
Jimcos are based on the price received for yellowcake.

Those

royalties may vary from eight percent to a ceiling of fifteen
percent of that price (R. 33-35).

The royalties due to the

Jimcos are to be paid only after satisfaction of the full
royalties due to the lessors (the Audreys and Rio) under the
Amended Audrey Lease.

It is this order of priority in making

royalty payments which led to this lawsuit, since the Jimcos
might conceivably collect no royalties at all under certain
circumstances which are explained next.
(c)

Interrelationship of Royalties.

As noted

above, one of the elections available under the Amended Audrey
Lease is based on yellowcake sales price, like the sole royalty
basis for payments to the Jimcos under the Rio-Jimco Option
Agreement.

So long as the Audreys chose to elect royalties

based on yellowcake price, then, the Jimcos would always be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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assured of receiving the royalties allowable to them under the
Rio-Jimco Option Agreement, up to the fifteen percent ceiling
provided in that agreement.
If market conditions changed, however, and the Audreys
elected the second royalty option based on the value of crude
ore, the Jimcos could conceivably be caught in a royalty "squeeze"
and receive little or no royalties.

The following hypotheticals

illustrate this potential "squeezing effect."

EXAHPLE I
Assume:

Total price for yellowcake
Total value of ore

Ceiling on total royalties
payable
I.A. If Audreys choose 4%
yellowcake election,
the parties receive:
Audreys:

$ 15.00

I.B. If Audreys choose 8%
ore election,
the parties receive:
Audreys:

3% yellowcake

= $3.00
Rio:

l% yellowcake
$1.00

Rio:

$15 ceiling less
royalties to
Lessors:

Jimcos:

=

Jimco:

15 -

[3+1]

$100.00
$ 75.00

15-4

= $11.00

6% ore

=

6%

(75)

2% ore = 2%

(75)

= $4.50
= $1.50

$15 less royalties
to lessors:
$15 - [4.50+1.50]
$9.00

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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EXAMPLE II
Assume:

Total price for yellowcake
Total value of ore

Ceiling still same because
yellowcake price same
II.A If Audreys choose 4%
yellowcake election,
the parties receive the
same royalties as I.A.

$100.00
$187.50
$ 15.00

II.B.

If Audreys elect 8%
ore, the parties receive:
Audreys:

6% ore

=
Rio:

(187.50)

2%

(187. SO,

$11.25

=

2% ore

=
Jimcos:

6%

$3.75

$15-

=

[11.25+3.75]

$15-15

=

$0.

The foregoing examples are of course hypothetical and are
not intended to reflect actual current or projected values of
ore and yellowcake.

Nonetheless, they are useful to illustrate

the general principle that the Jimcos' earned royalties will
suffer, perhaps dramatically, if
eight percent ore royalty, and

(1)

(2)

the Audreys choose the

the value of ore approaches

or exceeds the price received for yellowcake.

Even under the

first example, in which ore has a lower total value than yellowcake, the Jimcos would receive $2.00 less under the ore election
than they would under the yellowcake election -- an eighteen
percent decrease in income.
Nor are these examples completely hypothetical.

Counsel

for the Jimcos is in fact deeply concerned about this "squeeze,"
as illustrated by the following argument he made to the court:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If Audrey and Rio were to prevail on
their original theory of fair market
value of ore and get this Court to impose
a fair market value figure that is in effect
the present spot prices for small size,
that would eliminate Jimco .
. if the
price goes up another couple of bucks.
[Remarks of Mr. Savage, R.2206]
3.

Genesis of this Lawsuit.

In August 1975, the Audrey defendants elected to exercise
the option in the Amended Audrey Lease to change the royalty
payment basis from the four percent yellowcake to the eight
percent ore option (R. 3) .

It must logically be assumed that

they believed this election would increase the income they
would receive as lessors.

It was that election which gave

rise to Rio's institution of this declaratory judgment action,
after unsuccessful attempts by the parties to determine the
basis for computing that royalty obligation.
The Audreys asserted that the basis for calculating this
royalty was to be arrived at by reference to an "external"
uranium ore market, i.e., that the royalties should not be
computed on the basis of what Rio itself received for sales of
materials from the subject claims (R. 4).

The Jirncos, on the

other hand, asserted that the basis for calculating the royalty
should be arrived at by reference to the "internal" market,
i.e., Rio's actual selling price for yellowcake produced from
the subject properties (R. 4).

The Jimcos doubtless believed

that this •· internal" reference would be lower than the Audreys'
preferred "external" reference, so that the Jimcos' total
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share of the royalties would not be reduced as much.

Since

the Jimcos and the Audreys could not compromise on these
materially different positions, Rio instituted this action so
that the court could resolve that issue (R. 6).
4.

The Purported "Settlement" Between the Audreys
and Jimcos.

In July 1978, shortly before the matter was scheduled to
go to trial, the Audreys and the Jimcos entered into an agreement
to which Rio was not a party, and which they cosmetically
entitled "Settlement Stipulation and Motion."

In that agreement,

the Audreys and the Jimcos attempted to permanently determine
the basis to be used by Rio in calculating its royalty obligations under the Amended Audrey Lease (R. 2241-2247).

Not only

was Rio not a party to this stipulation, Rio also objected to
its terms.
The purported settlement contains two provisions which Rio
contends fundamentally violate its rights flowing from the
Amended Audrey Lease.

As noted above, the Amended Audrey Lease

provided that the Audreys could annually elect whether to take
their royalty on the basis of four percent yellowcake or eight
percent ore.

In the purported settlement agreement the Audreys

forever forfeit this option, as more fully explained in the
following contract language from the purported settlement:
2. For the calendar year 1979, and all
years thereafter, the Audrey defendants
hereby waive their right to the election
of royalty payments based upon market
value of crude ore as provided in
paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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agree to timely revoke their previous
election under paragraph 3.2. Timely
notice of the revocation of said election
will be provided by the Audrey defendants
to Rio.
[R.2243].
Rio contends that the waiver of this election directly affects
its rights and expectancy interests under the Amended Audrey
Lease.

Rio contends that it could originally have expected

(when the contract was executed) that the Audreys would perpetually make elections in their own selfish interests (and
thereby benefit Rio which receives twenty-five percent of the
royalties paid under the Audrey Lease).

Under the purported

settlement, however, the Audreys have forfeited this election
and have agreed to perpetually elect four percent yellowcake,
leaving Rio with twenty-five percent of that royalty (or one
percent yellowcake) , even though the ore election may produce
greater returns to Rio in the future.
In exchange for the waiver of the election, the Jimcos
agreed in paragraph l.c of the purported settlement to transfer
certain of their royalties to the Audreys.

The purported

settlement provides that the Jimcos assign to the Audreys "that
amount which, when added to that amount which the Audrey
defendants would otherwise receive directly from Rio, equals
5.5 percent of the proceeds received by Rio from Duke Power
Company, or any other purchaser, for the sale of yellowcake"
(R. 2243).
Rio contends that this too directly violates its rights
under the Audrey Lease because under that lease Rio always
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

received twenty-five percent of the "Audrey royalty pie,"
whereas under the new arrangement Rio will receive one percent
of yellowcake while Audrey will receive 5.5 percent of yellowcake -- effectively reducing Rio's percentage of the so-called
royalty pie from twenty-five percent to 15.3 percent.
The purported settlement agreement was presented to the
court for approval in the form of a "Settlement Stipulation and
Motion."

The motion for approval was much more than a mere

request of the court to approve a settlement as between the two
parties to that settlement; in addition, it requested the court
to make a substantive ruling determining Rio's rights.

The

motion which accompanied the request for approval read as
follows:
The Audrey defendants and the Jimco defendants hereby move the court for a ruling
that Rio has no standing under either the
Audrey lease or the Jimco agreement, or any
other theory of law or equity, to challenge
or otherwise bar the effectuation and
implementation of the foregoing Settlement
Stipulation, that such Settlement Stipulation is not in violation of any duty owed
to Rio by any of the defendants, that upon
effectuation and implementation of said
Settlement Stipulation the Audrey defendants
are effectively and totally dismissed from
this litigation, and that those funds
presently on deposit with the court equal
to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale of
yellowcake by Rio since January 1, 1976,
together with accrued interest thereon,
less any amounts previously withdrawn by
Audrey defendants therefrom, be promptly
paid to the Audrey defendants.
[R.2246].
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What was presented to Judge Conder, therefore, was a
procedurally unique request whereby he was directly asked to
rule that the purported settlement had no impact whatsoever on
any rights of Rio either in law or in equity.
Rio filed objections to the proposed Settlement Stipulation and also filed an amended complaint wherein it asserted
that the Stipulation constituted, among other things, tortious
interference with its contract rights, a breach of fiduciary
duties owed to it, and a violation of its contract rights.
After argument and the submission of memoranda (but without the benefit of discovery, jury trial, or other procedural
niceties) , the trial court summarily approved the Settlement
Stipulation, ruled that Rio had no rights in the matter,
allowed Rio to amend its complaint, and then dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

It is from

this Order that the appeal is brought.
The following chart briefly summarizes the various ownership, tenancy and royalty relationships among the parties.
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1.
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3.

RIO
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.J I ~.._-tJ:

')

STATE~lliNT

I.

OF POINTS

The trial court erred in approving the Stipulation
because that agreement varies the Amended Audrey
Lease and the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement without
the concurrence of all parties to both agreements.

II.

The trial court erred in allowing the Audreys and
Jimcos to alter the Amended Audrey Lease without
Rio's consent, since Rio is an intended beneficiary
of that lease.

III.

The trial court erred in approving the Stipulation
because waiver of the royalty election in exchange
for an additional 2.5 percent yellowcake proceeds
royalty is a breach by the Audreys of fiduciary duties
owed to Rio.

IV.

The trial court erred in approving the Stipulation
because that agreement breaches an implied covenant
by the Audreys in favor of Rio.

v.

The trial court erred in dismissing Rio's Amended
Complaint.
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PREFACE TO

ARGU~ffiNT

It should be understood by the Court, in reviewing the
arguments which follow, that the unique and summary procedure
employed below in approving the purported settlement, a procedure violative of fundamental concepts of due process, colors
the entire appellate consideration of the substantive issues.
The closest analogy that we can suggest is that the trial court
has, in effect, granted a motion against Rio finding that Rio
cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

(We

suggest this analogy because there has been no trial of the
matter, there was no evidentiary hearing, and there were not
even the limited procedural safeguards normally attending a
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56).

Therefore, we

contend that the normal appellate presumptions and standards
applicable to a ruling under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure should apply in the Court's analysis of the
substantive issues set forth hereinafter.

The legal standard in

this state in such matters was set forth by this Court in
Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 460, 243 P.2d
441, 443 (1952), wherein the Court held:
A motion to dismiss should not be granted
unless it appears to a certainty that
plaintiff would be entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of its claim.
[Emphasis
added].
See also Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service,
24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970).
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In~,

Merely because this matter has been presented in the form
of a purported ''Settlement Agreement"

(which automatically

evokes the traditional judicial sympathy in favor of settling
matters) , the Court should not lose sight of the fact that in
addition to merely settling disputes as between themselves,
the Audreys and Jimcos have purported definitively to determine the rights of Rio as well.
We suggest, therefore, that in reviewing the arguments to
follow herein, the Court review them as it would the granting
of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6).

The questions

thus presented, for example, are not whether Audrey and Jimco
have violated duties to Rio but whether, under the Athas
holding, it has been demonstrated to a certainty that Rio
could not prove a violation of duties under the pleadings as
set forth in its Amended Complaint.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN APPROVING THE STIPULATION
BECAUSE THAT AGREEMENT VARIES
THE AMENDED AUDREY LEASE
AND THE RIO-JIMCO OPTION AGREEMENT
WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL PARTIES
TO BOTH AGREEMENTS.
By virtue of the Stipulation and the trial court's Order
entered in accordance therewith, the Audrey defendants agreed
to permanently waive the eight percent ore royalty election in
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exchange for an additional yellowcake proceeds royalty of two
and one-half percent.

In so acting, the Audreys have permanently

rescinded an election in whose proceeds Rio formerly would have
shared, in exchange for an additional yellowcake royalty in
which Rio will not share.

Because of that agreement, Rio's

participation in royalty proceeds from the subject claims will
be permanently reduced from twenty-five percent of the whole to
15.3 percent.
The effect of the Stipulation is to work two material and
permanent changes to the Amended Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco
Option Agreement.

Those modifications are:

(1) permanent

waiver of the ore election in the Amended Audrey Lease, and
(2) a permanent reduction in Rio's pro rata share of royalties
from the subject claims.

The trial court erred in approving the

Stipulation which implements those material changes to the
agreements between the parties without Rio's consent to either
change.
The second change (reduction of Rio's share of the royalties)
is by itself sufficient to constitute significant damage to Rio.
But the first change (waiver of the election) could conceivably
have an even more damaging impact.

Reference to the hypotheticals

in Section 2(c) of the preceding Statement of Facts is perhaps
the best summary of the impact of this waiver on Rio.

Had the

Audreys maintained their insistence on an eight percent ore
royalty, Rio might well have received considerably more money
than it will under the four percent yellowcake election.

By
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abandoning the ore royalty the Audreys have of course also
permanently precluded Rio from sharing in the consequences of
that potentially more lucrative formula.
The trial court approved this outcome and dismissed Rio's
amended complaint without taking any evidence whatsoever on the
potential consequences of the Audreys' waiver.

Rather, the trial

court was apparently persuaded by Jimco counsel's assertion in
oral argument that, "You can't presume that Audrey would prevail
on its theory of fair market value [at trial] and assume from
that that Audrey and Rio together would have made a lot more
money on the royalties.
going to succeed"

It can't be presumed that they are

(Remarks of Mr. Savage, R.2304].

Certainly it

cannot be "presumed" that the Audreys would have prevailed on
their asserted basis for computing ore royalties.

But it like-

wise cannot be "presumed," as the trial court apparently did,
that the Audreys would certainly have lost at trial either.

If,

as Jimco counsel hinted, the Audreys had prevailed, Rio had paid
the Lessors that ore royalty, and as a result "Audrey and Rio
together . . . made a lot more money on the royalties," then Rio
is clearly damaged by the "settlement."

It will never be entitled

to that more lucrative income because the Audreys have abdicated
the ore royalty election and the trial court failed to allow any
discovery or trial on these potential damages.
The trial court approved the "settlement" between the Audreys
and Jimcos in complete disregard not only of Rio's claims of
damage but also of the fundamental principle that a contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cannot be modified without the consent of all contracting
parties.

In this case, both the Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco

Agreement have been materially modified without Rio's consent.
The Stipulation materially alters the terms of the Amended
Audrey Lease, to which Rio was a party and a lessor, because
both Rio's ownership rights and the former ore royalty election
are set forth in that agreement.
The Stipulation also materially amends the Rio-Jimco Option
Agreement because that agreement expressly provided that Rio was
assigned the Jimcos' tenancy rights under the Amended Audrey
Lease subject to "all

. . provisions, terms, covenants and

conditions" contained in that lease (Rio-Jimco Option Agreement,
Clause V(a), R. 24, and Amended Audrey Lease, 1119.1, R. 116-17).
Because Rio was assigned the Jimcos' tenancy rights subject to
all the terms and conditions of the Amended Audrey Lease, and
because the terms of that lease have been materially modified in
two respects by virtue of the Stipulation, the effect of the
Stipulation is also to alter materially the obligations which
Rio assumed under the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement.
It is fundamental law that the terms of a written lease
cannot be varied without the prior written consent of all lessors
The same rule of course applies to all contracts:

prior consent

of all parties is a prerequisite to any material modification of
the contract.

E.g., 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §465 at 935 ("A

modification of a contract requires the assent of .
parties to the contract").

all

Accord: Malstrom v. Consolidated
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Theaters, 4 Utah 2d 181, 184, 290 P. 2d 689, 691 (1955).

"A

meeting of the minds of contracting parties is required not only
to make a contract, but also to abrogate or modify it after it
is made."

Western Airlines v. Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130, 235

P.2d 792, 796

(1951).

For that matter, "[the] terms of a

contract cannot be changed even for the benefit of a party
without his knowledge and approval.

Columbian Nat'l

Life Ins. Co. v. McClain, 115 Colo. 458, 174 P.2d 348, 351
(1946)

[emphasis supplied].

Since Rio is a named lessor in the Amended Audrey Lease,
the foregoing law clearly precludes any amendments to the terms
of that lease without Rio's prior written consent.

Similarly,

the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement expressly precludes any amendments to that agreement without the prior written consent of all
parties (Clause XXX, R. 64).

Because the amendments effected by

the Stipulation do materially alter both those agreements, the
trial court clearly erred in entering the Order appealed from,
an Order approving a modification which violates fundamental
contract law.

Furthermore, given the express prohibition to

amendments of the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement without the prior
consent of all parties, the lower court's approval of the
Stipulation also violates the fundamental rule that where "the
intent of the parties can be ascertained with reasonable certainty it must be given effect."

Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440,

443, 354 P. 2d 121, 123 (1960).
Because the Stipulation violates the express intentions of
the parties to both agreements, and because it materially alters
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the terms of both agreements, the Order approving that Stipulation must be reversed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ALLOWING THE AUDREYS AND JIMCOS
TO ALTER THE AMENDED AUDREY LEASE
WITHOUT RIO'S CONSENT, SINCE RIO
IS AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THAT LEASE.
Rio is not only a party to but also an intended beneficiary of the Amended Audrey Lease.

Rio is an intended

beneficiary by virtue of the lease provisions governing the
royalty election.

That is, although Rio is not allowed to

exercise the royalty election, a decision vested solely in the
Audreys, it is still entitled to participate in the outcome of
whichever election is made since it is a one-fourth owner and
therefore has a one-fourth interest in any royalty payments
made under the lease.
Rio is an intended beneficiary of the lease because the
original contracting parties, including Rio, intended that it
would be benefited (i.e., that it would receive one-fourth of
the royalty payments) under the election option.
Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338

See Hammill v.

(lOth Cir. 1954); !1ontgomery v.

Rief, 15 Utah 495, 50 P. 623 (1897).
Once a beneficiary has accepted or acted on the terms of
an agreement made for his benefit, the original parties to
that agreement cannot alter its provisions without the consent
of that beneficiary.
(lOth Cir. 1974)

See Manning v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d 1311

(applying Utah law).
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When the Audrey defendants signed the Stipulation, they
agreed permanently to waive their right to exercise the eight
percent ore royalty election.

The effect of this decision was

to abdicate forever the rights of both Rio and the Audreys to
choose to have royalties paid based upon eight percent of the
fair market value of crude ore.

The permanent waiver of that

election constitutes a material modification to the Amended
Audrey Lease, a modification made without Rio's consent and
accomplished by virtue of an agreement to which it was not a
party.
Therefore, because the effect of the Stipulation is to
vary the Amended Audrey Lease without Rio's consent, even
though Rio is an intended beneficiary, the trial court erred
in approving the Stipulation and its Order must be reversed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE STIPULATION BECAUSE WAIVER
OF THE ROYALTY ELECTION IN EXCHANGE
FOR AN ADDITIONAL 2.5 PERCENT YELLOWCAKE PROCEEDS
ROYALTY IS A BREACH BY THE AUDREYS
OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO RIO.
When the trial court approved the Audrey defendants'
permanent waiver of the royalty election, it also approved a
deliberate breach of fiduciary duties owed by the Audreys to
Rio.

As a one-fourth owner of the properties, Rio was entitled

to the benefits of whichever election was made by the Audrey
defendants, even though it had no right to exercise that election option itself.

When the Audrey defendants agreed perrnan-

ently to waive that option, in whose benefits Rio was formerly
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d

entitled to partici?ate, and the Audreys received in exchange an
additional 2.5 percent royalty, they clearly engaged in selfdealing to Rio's detriment.
In Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377

(lOth Cir. 1963), co-

owners of oil and gas leases sued another co-owner whom they had
designated as the operating agent and lessee of those properties.
The co-tenant/operating agent agreed in the leases to operate
the subject properties to the mutual interests of all parties to
the leases.

The co-tenant/lessors alleged that the operating

agent had failed to protect and market the minerals discovered
in his drilling activities.
The Tenth Circuit noted that when one or more co-tenants
vest another co-tenant with the rights and responsibilities of
operating their common property, all the co-tenants "become coadventurers in the enterprise, and stand in a fiducial relationship to each other."

The court further noted that the operating

agent/co-tenant assumed the responsibility under the leases of
acting "for and on behalf of his co-tenants and he is thus the
trustee for his co-tenants and co-adventurers."
383.

325 F.2d at

The court also explained that, given this interrelationship

between the parties, the operating agent assumed the following
responsibilities:
[A]n undivided owner who is to manage
and operate the lease stands in a fiduciary
relationship to his coadventurers and is
bound to exercise the utmost good faith
in managing and operating such lease and
reporting and accounting to his co-owners
with respect to such management and
operation.
Id. at 387-88.
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Rio and the Audreys stand in a position similar to that
among the co-owners in Britton.

Both parties are tenants in

common of the subject claims, and Rio delegated to the Audreys
an important right under the Amended Audrey Lease, i.e., the
decision to elect between either permissible basis for royalty
payments under that lease.

Therefore, the Audreys owe Rio a

fiduciary duty in exercising that royalty election, and they
must make election decisions in a manner which evidences the
"utmost good faith" and which benefits not only themselves but
Rio as well.

When the Audreys took an additional 2.5 percent

yellowcake royalty by virtue of the Stipulation, increasing
their own royalty interest and decreasing Rio's pro rata share
in those royalties, they made a decision which clearly evidences
self-dealing and abrogates their fiduciary responsibilities to
Rio, the other co-owner of the Audrey claims.
For that matter, even where one co-tenant does not delegate important operating rights to other co-tenants, tenants in
common still owe each other fiduciary responsibilities in
dealing with the property subject to their co-tenancy.

~~

Hendrickson v. California Talc Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 279, 130
806

(1943)

(also involving mining claims).

As the Hendrickson

court explained:
The usual rules that a fiduciary relationship exists between tenants in common
and that one cotenant may not gain a
present advantage by acting adversely to
his fellow tenants should be applied to
[this] case.
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P.2d

The general rule is that parties engaged
in a common enterprise owe a duty to
each other with respect to all matters
in connection therewith, that a trust
relationship is inherent in such an
association for a common purpose, and
that one of the parties will not be
allowed to deal with the subject matter
of the association for his own advantage.
-- 103 P.2d at 810.
By the logic of the Hendrickson decision, then, the Audrey
defendants have breached a fiduciary duty owed to Rio independent of the responsibilities which they owed Rio by virtue of
their exclusive right to exercise the royalty election.

That

is, the mere fact that Rio and the Audreys are both tenants in
common of the subject claims is in itself independently sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship between them, and when
the Audreys permanently waived the election decision and engaged
in self-dealing in agreeing to that waiver, they violated a
basic fiduciary responsibility to Rio.
For each of the foregoing independent reasons, the trial
court erred in approving the Stipulation, as the conduct approved
in the court's Order constituted a breach of fiduciary obligations to Rio.

The Order must therefore be reversed.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPROVING
THE STIPULATION BECAUSE THAT AGREEMENT
BREACHES AN IMPLIED COVENANT BY THE AUDREYS
IN FAVOR OF RIO.
Not only does the Settlement Stipulation entail breaches of
fiduciary duty owed by the Audreys to Rio, it also constitutes a
breach of an implied covenant of good faith owed by the Audreys
to Rio.

Many jurisdictions recognize implied covenants in

mineral leases which impose a duty on the operator of such
leases to conduct the business to the mutual profit of both the
lessee and the non-participating landowner-lessor.
In Shaw v. Henry, 216 Kan. 96, 531 P.2d 128 (1975), for
example, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized that all lessees
under oil and gas leases are required by an implied covenant to
exercise "reasonable diligence in doing what would be expected
of an operator of ordinary prudence, in the furtherance of the
interests of both lessor and lessee."

531 P.2d at 131.

Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84,

Accord:

(5th Cir.

1966); Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 470 (W.D.Okla. 1963).
In this case, the Amended Audrey Lease contains an implied
covenant that the Audreys will make the election determination
in "furtherance of the interests of" all lessors, including Rio.
The Audreys' waiver of their right to exercise the election in
exchange for an additional yellowcake proceeds royalty in which
Rio does not participate breaches that implied covenant.
The implied covenant principles above stated with respect
to oil and gas leases have been broadly applied to other situaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tions involving tenants in common, and clearly derive from the
beneficiary duties owed by co-tenants to each other.

As one

commentary has succinctly explained those principles:
In certain situations, fiduciary duties
between co-tenants will rest upon a bailiff
arrangement. Where one co-owner surrenders
management functions to another for the
development of joint interests, the manager
is called the bailiff and by the great weight
of authority has a fiduciary status very
similar to that of a trustee. Although he
lacks title to a common trust corpus, he
tacitly agrees to serve the property of all.
lvhen he obtains an advantage over his cotenant by contract, he assumes the duty to
exercise that advantage fairly and responsibly. His fiduciary obligations, accordingly,
are very broad.
-- .Ciartz & Hames, "Implied Rights of Royalty
Owners," 3 Rocky Mtn. Mineral Law Inst. 195,
222 \1957).
The same writers stress that implied duties have provided
equitable protection to one party against overreaching by another.
Equity will intervene where the following conditions are present:
First, where the parties have a relationship
to each other arising out of a common interest
in the property or enterprise.
Second, where
they stand to gain or lose as a direct consequence of failure of the enterprise. Third,
where one party by contract or conveyance has
obtained the executive control over the interest
of another. And finally, where the nonexecutive has no adequate way to protect himself against unfair or inequitable decisions
of the executive. All of these elements
characterize the mineral royalty relationship
and give a sound basis for the implication of
fiduciary duties to the mineral owner.
-- Id. at 228-29.
In summary, whenever one co-owner surrenders some "executive control" to another, the executive co-owner occupies a
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fiduciary position.

The Audreys' exclusive right to exercise

the royalty election therefore imposes on them such responsibilities to Rio.
Furthermore, the Audreys owe Rio a duty to act in good
faith simply by virtue of their status as co-owners.

Examina-

tion of the Amended Audrey Lease (R. 74-125) reveals that Rio
surrendered no rights in that document as an owner-lessor cotenant to its other tenants in common, except the right to
participate in any decision as to whether or not to exercise
the royalty election.

Rio did not surrender any rights to

participate fully in the proceeds arising out of its status as
owner-lessor of an undivided one-fourth interest, or to demand
and receive from its other co-tenants an accounting with
respect to the use of, and proceeds derived from, the property.
Tenants in common owe each other fiduciary duties with
respect to their dealings with commonly held property.

Conse-

quently, one or a number of co-tenants may not gain an advantage
by acting adversely to his or their fellow co-tenants.
Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah 2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957).

See
If one or

a number of co-tenants deal with commonly held property to the
detriment of a fellow co-tenant, that fiduciary duty is breached.
See Webster v. Knop, supra; Hendrickson v. California Talc Co.,
supra.
In Webster v. Knop this Court considered facts analogous
to the instant case and discussed the scope of a co-tenant's
fiduciary duty.

In that case, two plaintiffs and a defendant
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executed a mining grubstake contract whereby plaintiffs supplied
labor and the defendant furnished supplies.

They agreed that

each would receive a one-third undivided interest in any claim
staked pursuant to the contract, which expired July 31, 1954.
Various claims were filed in the names of the three parties.
The parties were later informed that the claims were void
because of an existing oil and gas lease.

Congress then

enacted legislation allowing valid claims to be filed over
existing oil and gas leases.

Thereafter, on August 14, 1954,

the defendant refiled the claims in his own name.
In holding that the scope of the fiduciary duty survived
the expiration of the grubstake agreement, this Court emphasized
equitable considerations.

Defendant knew of the mining claims

only out of his fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs.

Defen-

dant's self-dealing attempt to use knowledge of the legislation
and of the claims to gain title to an entire claim, when he had
specifically agreed to a one-third interest, was deemed unfair.
The foregoing discussion related to this case because the
Webster court extended the fiduciary duty beyond the strict
confines of the contract to prevent inequity.
expired when the defendant refiled the claims.

The contract had
Nevertheless

this Court held that the defendant's fiduciary duty required
him to refile the claims in the name of all three parties.
In this case, the Audrey defendants owe a fiduciary duty to
their co-tenant, Rio.

That duty is consistent with the lease and

with the principles enumerated by this Court in Webster.

By

self-dealing with the Jimco defendants, the Audreys have
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attempted to sever the link between themselves and Rio.
Webster indicates that the Audreys' duty to their co-tenant to
choose the more profitable royalty formula extends beyond the
provisions of the lease and precludes them from self-dealing
with the election.
The foregoing authorities clearly support a finding that
the Audreys are bound by an implied covenant of good faith which
runs in favor of Rio in making the royalty election determination.

This duty arises independently by virtue of (1) the

parties' status as co-tenants and (2) the Audreys' responsibilities to Rio as managers of the royalty election.

Their

overreaching in this case was approved by the trial court's
Order implementing the Stipulation, and that Order must be
reversed.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
RIO'S AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Two weeks after the Audreys and the Jimcos submitted their
Settlement Stipulation to the trial court for its approval, Rio
submitted a motion to amend its complaint and a proposed amended
complaint (R. 2023-24, 2099-110).

Rio moved to amend its

complaint on the grounds that the Stipulation gave rise to
additional causes of action in its favor against both the Jimcos
and the Audreys.
Rio alleged in its Amended Complaint that the Audreys had
breached fiduciary duties owed to it arising out of the election
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option waiver and their common status as co-owners of the subject
claims (R. 2104-07).

Rio further alleged that the Jimcos had

induced the Audreys to breach the fiduciary duties which the
Audreys owed to Rio (R. 2107-09).

Rio prayed for the imposition

of a continuing constructive trust on the proceeds received by
the Audreys arising out of the Stipulation and also sought
damages from the Jimcos.
The merits of Rio's claims for breach of fiduciary duty
against the Audrey defendants are discussed at some length in the
foregoing arguments and will not be reiterated here.

Rio

simply respectfully submits that the trial court erred in ruling
that those claims failed to state a cause of action against the
Audreys.
As to Rio's claims that the Jimcos induced the Audreys to
breach fiduciary duties they owed Rio, absolutely no evidence
was taken by the trial court which would either support or
negate that cause of action.

Obviously, if the court below

erred, as Rio asserts that it did, in dismissing the causes
of action in Rio's Amended Complaint against the Audreys, it
also erred in dismissing those causes asserted against the
Jimcos, as it should have been entitled to conduct discovery and
present facts to the trial court in support of its claims that
the Jimcos induced the Audreys to breach those fiduciary duties.
Rio submits that the trial court erred in refusing Rio the
opportunity to conduct discovery and attempt to prove those
claims, which involve material issues of fact as to the intent
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of the parties and the detriment which would be suffered by Rio
as a result of the Stipulation.

Under those circumstances,

either summary judgment or dismissal under Rule 12(b) (6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is precluded.

~'

Livingston

Ind., Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117, 1118
(Utah 1977); See also, Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562
P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977); Liquor Control Commission v. Athas,
supra.

Consequently, the trial court also erred in dismissing

Rio's Amended Complaint and that portion of its Order must
also be reversed.

CONCLUSION
As the foregoing arguments and authorities demonstrate,
the trial court erred both in approving the Stipulation and in
dismissing Rio's Amended Complaint.

For those reasons, the

entire Order of the court below should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~

J

day of January, 1979.

YQRDON L. ROBERTS

~&~~~~
N'f W~WINTEOLLE
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)
532-1234
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